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Abstract
The segmented structure of the influenza virus genome plays a pivotal role in its adaptation to new hosts and the
emergence of pandemics. Despite concerns about the pandemic threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1
viruses, little is known about the biological properties of H5N1 viruses that may emerge following reassortment with
contemporary human influenza viruses. In this study, we used reverse genetics to generate the 63 possible virus
reassortants derived from H5N1 and H3N2 viruses, containing the H5N1 surface protein genes, and analyzed their viability,
replication efficiency, and mouse virulence. Specific constellations of avian–human viral genes proved deleterious for viral
replication in cell culture, possibly due to disruption of molecular interaction networks. In particular, striking phenotypes
were noted with heterologous polymerase subunits, as well as NP and M, or NS. However, nearly one-half of the reassortants
replicated with high efficiency in vitro, revealing a high degree of compatibility between avian and human virus genes.
Thirteen reassortants displayed virulent phenotypes in mice and may pose the greatest threat for mammalian hosts.
Interestingly, one of the most pathogenic reassortants contained avian PB1, resembling the 1957 and 1968 pandemic
viruses. Our results reveal the broad spectrum of phenotypes associated with H5N1/H3N2 reassortment and a possible role
for the avian PB1 in the emergence of pandemic influenza. These observations have important implications for risk
assessment of H5N1 reassortant viruses detected in surveillance programs.
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Introduction
The emergence of an influenza virus that will cause a pandemic
is inevitable and therefore preparedness is mandatory. The new
pandemic influenza virus is likely to carry a hemagglutinin (HA)
gene other than the currently circulating H1 and H3 lineages in
order to escape immunity in the human population. However, we
cannot predict the mechanism by which the pandemic influenza
virus will emerge. One possibility is the transfer of an avian
influenza virus from birds to humans, made possible by adaptive
mutations, as postulated for the 1918 pandemic [1,2]. Another
possible scenario would follow the paradigm of the H2N2 and
H3N2 influenza pandemics of 1957 and 1968 in which avian virus
genes were incorporated into circulating human influenza viruses
by reassortment [3], giving rise to viruses with novel surface
antigens; i.e. antigenic shift. The segmented structure of the viral
genome facilitates exchange of gene segments between two viruses
co-infecting a single host cell. Dual infection with avian and
human influenza viruses and subsequent reassortment may occur
in hosts that are susceptible to both kinds of viruses and serve as
mixing vessels that generate novel reassortants [4,5].
Wild aquatic birds are the natural reservoirs for influenza A
viruses and have been found to harbor each of the 16 known HA
subtypes [6]. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1
viruses are now enzootic among wild birds and poultry in three
continents (http://www.who.int). Since 1997, when HPAI H5N1
viruses first emerged in Hong Kong to cause human respiratory
illness and death, over 360 laboratory-confirmed human infections
have been reported. Most human infections are caused by contact
with infected poultry and to date H5N1 viruses have not yet
acquired the ability to transmit efficiently among humans.
A major obstacle to transmission of the H5N1 virus among
humans is thought to be the preferred receptor specificity of the
H5 HA towards sialic acid (SA) with a2,3 linkage to galactose (the
so-called avian receptor) [7,8]. A switch of receptor specificity
towards a2,6 linked SA (the human receptor) is considered to be a
pre-requisite for sustained human to human transmission [9,10].
However, it is not known whether other genes from H5N1 viruses
would confer virulence and transmissibility in humans. It has been
shown that a reassortant virus with the HA and NA from an H3N2
human virus and the PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M, and NS (so-called
internal genes) of an H5N1 virus did not transmit efficiently in a
ferret model [11]. (In this report, the term ‘‘internal genes’’ refers
to the gene constellation comprising PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M, and
NS, although the M gene encodes for the M2 protein, which is
surface-exposed in virions.) The internal genes from this avian
PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org 1 May 2008 | Volume 4 | Issue 5 | e1000072
H5N1 virus were therefore postulated to lack at least one essential
functional attribute to initiate a human pandemic. These critical
function(s) might be acquired through a reassortment event
between the H5N1 virus with a circulating human H3N2
influenza virus that generates the appropriate gene constellation.
In theory, a single reassortment event between two influenza A
viruses can yield up to 254 (28 minus two parental viruses) hybrid
genotypes. However, the few available reports suggest that the
number of natural or experimental reassortants is likely to be smaller
[5,12,13,14,15,16]. Reliable estimates of the expected frequency of
hybrid genotypes resulting from dual infections are not possible in
the absence of systematic studies on human-avian influenza
reassortment. Comprehensive in vivo co-infection studies and in vitro
evaluations of all the reassortant genotypes derived from a human
influenza virus and an HPAI virus would help bridge this gap of
knowledge. In this report, we analyze the repertoire of reassortants
between contemporary avian H5N1 and human H3N2 viruses by
evaluating the phenotypes of 63 (26-1) viral reassortants with HA and
NA genes from an avian H5N1 virus and the six internal genes from
either parental virus, assigned higher priority because only viruses
with novel surface antigens may cause a pandemic. We used reverse
genetics to derive the reassortant virus panel, and subsequently
examined their replication characteristics in cell culture and their
virulence in a mammalian system. Our in vitro and in vivo analyses
revealed a high frequency of viable reassortants with a wide spectrum
of virulence for mice, providing insight into their potential for future
emergence in nature.
Results
Characterization of reverse genetics-derived H5N1
reassortant viruses in cell culture
To generate the collection of human-avian reassortant viruses
for this study, we first developed plasmid-based reverse genetics
(rg) systems for the two parental viruses; A/Wyoming/3/2003
(subtype H3N2) (WY03) and A/Thailand/16/2004 (H5N1)
(TH04) [17]. The parental WY03 virus showed a2,6 linked SA
receptor specificity [18], replicated to high titers in MDCK cell
culture, and was avirulent in mice (data not shown). The TH04
virus showed a2,3 receptor specificity [8], replicated efficiently in
MDCK cells and was highly virulent for mice [17]. Virus recovery
from plasmid DNA transfections was evaluated by quantitative
plaque analysis at 72 hours (h) post-transfection; herein referred to
as rescue efficiency. Cell cultures transfected with WY03 and
TH04 rg plasmids yielded .107 plaque-forming units (pfu)/ml of
progeny virus, termed rgWY03 and rgTH04, which formed 4–
5 mm diameter plaques, comparable to those of parental wildtype
(wt) viruses (Figure 1). A wide range of virus yields and plaque
diameters were obtained for each of the 63 H5N1 human-avian
reassortant (rH5N1) plasmid transfections. In order to categorize
the in vitro properties of each reassortant, rH5N1 genotypes were
segregated into 4 phenotypic groups, according to their rescue
efficiencies (Figures 1 and 2): (1) rH5N1 genotypes with wt or
near-wt replication efficiency. Twenty-eight rH5N1 viruses
(cell culture phenotype group 1) consistently yielded $106 pfu/ml
in the transfected cell cultures (Figure 1), which represented rescue
efficiencies similar to those of rgWY03 and rgTH04. Most of the cell
culture group 1 viruses formed ,2–4 mm plaques in diameter
(Figure 1). The efficient in vitro growth phenotypes of nearly one-half
of the rH5N1 viruses in the group revealed a high frequency of
functional compatibility between avian and human virus genes. (2)
rH5N1 genotypes with moderate cell culture replication
impairment. Fourteen rH5N1 viruses (22% of the rH5N1
genotypes) had rescue efficiencies between 104 and 106 pfu/ml (cell
culture phenotype group 2), and most of these viruses formed 1–
3 mm plaques (Figure 2). (3) rH5N1 genotypes with severe cell
culture replication impairment. Eight reassortants (13% of the
rH5N1 genotypes) yielded ,102–104 pfu/ml from transfected cell
cultures, with plaque size ranging from 0.5–2 mm (cell culture
phenotype group 3 in Figure 2). (4) Non-viable or marginally
viable rH5N1 genotypes. Thirteen rH5N1 viruses (,20% of
rH5N1 genotypes) yielded ,100 pfu/ml from transfected cell
cultures (cell culture phenotype group 4 in Figure 2). Their rescue
efficiencies were 5 log10 pfu/ml lower than their rg parent viruses.
The severe replication defects of viruses in this group may reflect
structural or functional incompatibilities in avian-human viral RNA
and/or protein complexes. Collectively, these categories guided our
rationale for excluding reassortants with severe replication defects
from further in vivo studies.
Notably, the severely impaired rH5N1 viruses in group 4
(Figure 2) were all characterized by the association of the
nucleoprotein (NP) gene from WY03 virus with matrix (M) and/
or nonstructural (NS) genes derived from TH04 virus. For
example, the single gene reassortant r5 (group 4), which carried
the NP from WY03 and the five other internal genes from TH04
had a rescue efficiency of ,102 pfu/ml. However, replacement of
the TH04 NS gene with the WY03 NS in the same background
increased rescue efficiency to ,104 pfu/ml (r5/8 virus, group 2,
Figure 2), which was significantly higher than r5 (P#0.0001).
Further introduction of the WY03 M segment into this gene
constellation restored the rescue efficiency and plaque size of the
reassortant virus (r5/7/8, group 1, Figure 1) to nearly wt level
(P#0.0001). In contrast, introduction of polymerase complex
genes did not improve replication (r5 replication is similar to r1/5,
r2/5, r3/5, and r1/2/3/5; P.0.9) (Figure 2). Conversely, only 6
out of 28 rH5N1 viruses (group 1) that replicated efficiently had
NP of human origin, in every case along with human NS (Figure 1).
These observations suggest that the NP gene of WY03 origin
preferentially interacts with M and NS genes of the same origin for
optimal replication. In contrast, the NP gene of the TH04 avian
virus appears to be more compatible with the M or NS of
heterologous origin (e.g., r1/2/3/7/8 virus replication was similar
Author Summary
The influenza pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were caused by
hybrid viruses consisting of a mixture of human and avian
influenza genes. The introduction of avian genes resulted
in a sudden change of the virus surface antigens, allowing
its worldwide spread due to lack of immunity in the
population. The highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1
virus has continued its spread in domestic and wild birds in
Asia, Europe, and Africa. Although H5N1 infection in
humans is rare and person-to-person transmission is very
inefficient, the steady accumulation of human cases has
raised concern over the possible reassortment between
H5N1 and human seasonal influenza resulting in a virus
with new surface antigens and pandemic potential. In this
study, we used recombinant DNA technology to generate
a systematic collection of hybrid viruses (with genes from
human and avian viruses) bearing H5N1 surface antigens
and analyzed their properties in cell culture and in mice.
The H5N1 hybrid viruses revealed a broad range of viability
and multiplication capacity in cell cultures. In addition,
several H5N1 hybrid viruses were highly virulent in mice.
Results from this systematic analysis provide important
insight to support risk assessment of reassortant H5N1
avian influenza viruses.
H5N1 Reassortant Influenza Viruses
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Figure 1. Characteristics of high yield avian-human reassortant viruses in cell culture. Human and chicken symbols denote the parental
WY03 or TH04 source of each gene segment. The genotype of reassortants (r) is denoted by the genes derived from WY03 virus, designated by their
segment number; 1:PB2. 2:PB1. 3:PA. 4:HA. 5:NP. 6:NA. 7:M. 8:NS. All others genes derived from TH04 do not bear a number. For example, r3/8
indicates the reassortant virus carries PA and NS genes from WY03 virus, and the remaining segments from TH04 virus. Rescue efficiency represents
the virus titer (log10 pfu/ml) from cell cultures at 72 hours after transfection; geometric mean from 3 independent experiments.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000072.g001
H5N1 Reassortant Influenza Viruses
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to r1/2/3/7 or r1/2/3/8; P = 1.0). Although not all viruses with
human NP and avian M or NS were severely impaired, they
generally displayed significantly reduced replication, suggesting
that avian M and/or NS may not be incorporated into seasonal
human H3N2 viruses in the absence of avian NP.
Another remarkable gene incompatibility was noted with the
r2/3/5/7/8 virus, bearing TH04 PB2 and the remaining five
internal genes from WY03 virus (Figure 2, group 3). This
reassortant virus formed tiny plaques (0.5 mm diameter) and
had a very low rescue efficiency. This defect was repaired by
providing a PA gene of avian virus origin; i.e., the rescue efficiency
of r2/3/5/7/8 was significantly lower than r2/5/7/8 (Figure 1,
group 1) (P,0.0001), suggesting a functional interaction of TH04
PB2 with the cognate avian PA gene. This finding suggests that
reassortment of avian PB2 genes with human viruses may be
linked to co-incorporation of the avian PA gene.
Virulence of rH5N1 viruses in mice
A set of 38 rH5N1 viruses with cell culture replication
efficiencies comparable to those of parental viruses, or with only
modest reductions, were chosen for study in a BALB/c mouse
model to assess their virulence in a mammalian host. The plasmid-
derived rgTH04 virus was highly virulent for mice, as indicated by
a very low intranasal 50% mouse infectious dose (MID50 = 10
1.5 -
pfu) and lethal dose (LD50 = 10
1.8 pfu) (Figure 3). This virus
replicated to high titers (.107 pfu/ml) in lungs by day 4 following
an intranasal inoculation of 104 pfu and caused .19% body
weight loss. Viral replication was also detected at systemic sites,
such as brain and spleen, recapitulating the outcome of infection
with the wt TH04 isolate [17]. In contrast, replication of the
rgWY03 virus in mice was very inefficient as evidenced by an
MID50 of 10
6 pfu and an LD50 of .10
6 pfu (determination of
MID50 for rgWY/03 required additional doses of 10
5 and 106 pfu
to detect virus in tissues; data not shown). However, the
reassortant virus bearing HA and NA from TH04 and the
remaining genes from WY03 virus (r1/2/3/5/7/8) replicated
efficiently (MID50 of 10
1.8 pfu and titer of 107 pfu/ml in the lung),
suggesting that the HA and/or NA from WY03 lack appropriate
interaction with receptors or other host factors in the mouse
respiratory tract [19]. Most importantly, the internal genes from
WY03 mediated efficient viral replication of r1/2/3/5/7/8 virus
in mice validating the BALB/c mouse as a useful model to
evaluate the influence of human/avian internal gene combinations
on the virulence phenotypes of rH5N1 viruses.
Three rH5N1 viruses were highly virulent for mice, with an
LD50,10
3 pfu (Figure 3, group A1). Each of these rH5N1 had an
MID50 of #10
1.5 pfu, replicated to high titers in the lung
($106.5 pfu/ml), and caused .17% weight loss by 6–7 days
post-infection (dpi) on average. The virulence of these viruses was
comparable to that of wt TH04. In addition, the high frequency of
virus detection in the spleen and brain of mice indicated systemic
spread of these viruses, resembling infection with wt TH04. The
ten viruses in group A2 were moderately virulent, with a mean
LD50 value that was significantly different from that of the highly
virulent group A1 viruses (P,0.001). The remaining 25 rH5N1
viruses in groups B1 and B2 exhibited low virulence phenotypes in
mice with LD50 values .10
4 pfu. However, five rH5N1viruses
(Figure 3, virulence group B1) caused significant transient weight
loss (.16%), clinical signs, such as ruffled haircoat and lethargy,
and three viruses (r1/3/7/8, r1/2/3/8, r1/5/7/8) each caused
mortality in a single mouse infected at 104 pfu, suggesting
potential for increased virulence at higher virus inoculums (data
not shown). The other 20 rH5N1 viruses (Figure 3, virulence
group B2) caused subclinical infections in mice, with minor weight
loss (,15%). These viruses spread to the spleen and /or brain
sporadically and their pulmonary replication capacity ranged from
substantially efficient to nil. Although many rH5N1 viruses with
high rescue efficiencies and large plaque phenotypes also displayed
highly virulent phenotypes in mice, several rH5N1 viruses
belonging to virulence group B2 (i.e., r2/7/8 and r1/3/8) had
high rescue efficiencies but did not replicate well in mice. This
finding highlights the limitations of inferring in vivo virulence
properties solely from efficient in vitro replication characteristics.
Figure 2. Characteristics of moderate to low yield avian-human
reassortant viruses in cell culture. Symbols and virus nomencla-
tures are the same as described in Figure 1. Rescue efficiency represents
virus titer (log10 pfu/ml) from cell cultures at 72 hours after transfection;
geometric mean from 3 independent experiments. Plaque formation by
reassortant viruses with ,100 pfu/ml rescue efficiency was not
determined (ND).
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000072.g002
H5N1 Reassortant Influenza Viruses
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Figure 3. Replication of avian-human reassortant viruses in mice. Symbols and virus nomenclature are as in Figure 1. The mouse infectious
dose (MID50) and lethal dose (LD50) are expressed as the log10 pfu required to give one MID50 or one LD50. Maximum mean weight loss was
determined from five mice per group (percent weight loss relative to dpi 0) following intranasal infection with 104 pfu. MST denotes the mean
survival time in days following infection with 104 pfu. Virus titer in lung, spleen, brain or nasal turbinate are geometric means of the log10 pfu at 4 dpi
of three mice infected with 104 pfu. LD50 values of rH5N1 in group A1 were significantly different from A2 and those from A1 and A2 were
significantly different from TH04 WT (P,0.001) by analysis of variance. The — indicate that tissue titers were below limit of detection of the assay (0.7
log10 pfu/ml). Viruses are listed in ascending LD50 values. Viruses with identical LD50 are listed by descending weight loss.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000072.g003
H5N1 Reassortant Influenza Viruses
PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org 5 May 2008 | Volume 4 | Issue 5 | e1000072
Interestingly, r1/3/5/7/8, one of the most virulent rH5N1
among the 38 reassortants inoculated into mice had a gene
constellation resembling that of the pandemic viruses from 1957
and 1968. In 1957, HA, NA and PB1 genes from an avian H2N2
virus were introduced into the circulating human H1N1 virus and
caused the so-called ‘‘Asian flu’’ pandemic, whereas the 1968
‘‘Hong Kong’’ pandemic virus incorporated the HA and PB1
genes from an avian donor [3]. In this study, a virus carrying HA,
NA and PB1 of avian origin and the remaining genes from a
human virus, namely r1/3/5/7/8, was highly virulent for mice
(LD50 = 10
2.5 pfu). In contrast, a reassortant virus (r1/2/3/5/7/8)
with all the internal genes from WY03 virus, including PB1,
caused minimal mortality and had a significantly different LD50
(1.3 log10 pfu increase; P,0.001), suggesting that the PB1 of
contemporary H5N1 viruses can reassort into circulating H3N2
viruses and increase their virulence for mice.
Efficient viral replication at the lower temperature of the upper
respiratory tract is thought to be essential for droplet transmission of
influenza virus between humans. Avian influenza viruses with a PB2
polymerase bearing glutamic acid at position 627 instead of lysine
have decreased replication at 33uC in mammalian cells [20,21,22].
Although both WY03 and TH04 viruses have lysine at position 627
in PB2, it is not known whether new avian and human gene
constellations would compromise viral replication at lower temper-
ature. To address this question, we determined reassortant viral titers
in the nasal turbinates collected at 4 dpi. We found that in general,
rH5N1 viruses replicated less efficiently in nasal turbinates than in
lungs, as reported previously [21]. Interestingly, some reassortants
(i.e., r2/7, r2/7/8, and r3/7/8) showed extremely low replication in
nasal turbinates despite considerable titers in lungs (Figure 3). These
reassortants would be expected to lack efficient transmissibility by
generation of nasal secretion droplets.
Replication of rH5N1 viruses in differentiated primary
human tracheobronchial epithelial (HTBE) cells
Although mice are regarded as a useful mammalian model for
studying the replication of HPAI viruses, the species differences
between humans and mice mandate studies with models from the
target species to complement the data. The epithelial cells of the
respiratory tract are the primary targets of influenza infection.
Therefore, we used in vitro differentiated HTBE cultures to
evaluate the replication potential of the rH5N1 viruses in humans
[23]. HTBE cells were infected with rgWY03 and rgTH04 viruses,
or each of 38 rH5N1 viruses that were previously analyzed for
virulence in mice. We quantified virus progeny released into the
apical side of the pseudostratified epithelium because budding of
HPAI H5N1 virus in the HTBE model remains polarized (data
now shown). As shown in Figure 4A, both rgTH04 and rgWY03
parental viruses replicated efficiently in the HTBE cells. The rapid
rise of WY03 virus titers to 108 pfu/ml at 32 h post-infection was
consistent with the efficient spread of human viruses in HTBE
cells, as described previously [23]. The plateau in WY03 virus
production may be caused by virus-induced cell death, first noted
at 40 h post-infection. In contrast, HTBE cells infected with
rgTH04 virus showed no cytopathology and virus progeny
increased steadily throughout the 56 h infection. The majority of
rH5N1 viruses produced $104 pfu/ml by 24 h post-infection, and
the growth kinetics were similar to parental rgTH04 or slightly
delayed (e.g., r1/2/3/5/7/8 in Figure 4B and data not shown for
others). In comparison, four rH5N1 viruses, r/3, r2/3, r3/8, r3/
7/8, replicated substantially less efficiently in the HTBE cells
(Figure 4, C and D). Interestingly, these four viruses also replicated
poorly in mice; had MID50 values of $4 log10 pfu and caused
minimal weight loss (Figure 3). These results supported the
virulence data provided by the mouse model.
Figure 4. Replication kinetics of avian-human reassortant viruses in differentiated human tracheobronchial epithelial (HTBE) cells.
HTBE cells were infected in duplicate with parental TH04 and WY03 (A) or rH5N1 viruses (B, C, D) at an moi of 0.02; progeny viruses were collected
and titrated on MDCK cells.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000072.g004
H5N1 Reassortant Influenza Viruses
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In vitro viral polymerase activity
To study the mechanisms underlying the differences in the
replication phenotypes of certain rH5N1, we exploited a mini-
genome reporter assay which dissects the function of the viral
ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex from the rest of the viral gene
products [24,25]. The 16 possible RNP combinations of PB2, PB1,
PA and NP from either the TH04 or WY03 viruses were studied at
33uC or 37uC, to recapitulate the temperatures of the upper and
lower respiratory tract, as reported previously [20]. Another panel
of RNP combinations with A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (VN04) viral
genes replacing TH04 genes was also analyzed in parallel to
extend the results for other H5N1 viruses. The human RNP was
almost equally active at 33uC and 37uC, whereas the avian RNP
activity was substantially reduced at 33uC despite the presence of
lysine at position 627 of PB2, in both TH04 and VN04
backgrounds (Figure 5). The RNP constituted by PB1 and PA
from WY03 virus and PB2 from TH04 (or VN04) virus resulted in
extremely low polymerase activities at 33uC and 37uC (Figure 5A
and B, RNP denoted by asterisks). Although the RNP complexes
carrying PB2 and PB1 from TH04 and PA from WY03 virus
showed partially reduced polymerase activity, a similar combina-
tion derived from VN04 and WY03 viruses showed a more
Figure 5. Polymerase activity of avian-human viral ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complexes. (A) A549 cells were transfected in duplicate with
pPol1-NS-Renilla and pSV40-Luc reporter plasmids, together with plasmids expressing PB2, PB1, PA and NP from either WY03 (human symbol) or
TH04 (chicken symbol) viruses. Cells were incubated at 33uC (hatched bars) or 37uC (solid bars) for 24 hours and cell lysates were analyzed to measure
Renilla and firefly luciferase activities. The latter was used to normalize transfection efficiency. Values shown represent the activities of each RNP
relative to that of WY03 measured at 37uC (100%). (B) Viral RNP activities derived from WY03 (human symbol) or VN04 (chicken symbol) viruses are
shown as described in panel A.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000072.g005
H5N1 Reassortant Influenza Viruses
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pronounced loss of replication activity (Figure 5A and B, RNP
denoted by arrows). The reduced polymerase activities of these
gene constellations were consistent with the low viral titer from
lungs and nasal turbinates of mice infected with reassortant viruses
r3/7/8, r3/8, r3 and r2/3 (Figure 3). Interestingly, the polymerase
activity of the RNP with PB1 from TH04 and the other proteins
from WY03 was comparable to that of the wt WY03 RNP. These
findings indicated that the increased mouse virulence attributed to
avian PB1 in the WY03 genetic background (r1/3/5/7/8) may
not directly result from stimulation of the polymerase activities of
the RNP. Alternative hypotheses to reconcile these observations
would include an in vivo role for PB1 in RNP function, a possible
modulation of host cell function by PB1-F2, or unknown
interactions of PB1 with the remaining 4 genes absent in this
assay: HA, NA, M and NS.
Characterization of a reverse genetics-derived H5N2
reassortant virus
Although H5N2 subtype viruses have been isolated from poultry
in North America and Asia for many years [26], it is not clear
whether the N2 derived from contemporary human H3N2 virus
can support the efficient replication of a reassortant virus bearing
the HA from circulating H5N1 virus. Balanced HA and NA
activities are critical for efficient influenza virus infection and
replication in various hosts. The HA of contemporary H5N1
viruses has retained a strong preference for a2,3 linked SA [7,8].
In contrast, the NA derived from H3N2 human seasonal isolates
has adapted over time to acquire a2,6 SA specificity [27,28]. To
evaluate the H5N2 reassortant, the NA of TH04 was replaced
with the N2 from WY03 virus by reverse genetics. This virus,
termed r6 (H5N2), was virtually identical to wt TH04 in rescue
efficiency and replication in HTBE cells (Figure 1 and Figure 4B).
In addition, this reassortant was highly virulent in mice, with an
LD50 comparable to the parental TH04 virus (Figure 3). These
results suggested that the NA activity from circulating H3N2
viruses can functionally support the activity of the H5 HA and
promote H5N2 virus spread in the mammalian host.
Discussion
The influenza pandemics of the past century were caused by
viruses carrying at least one internal gene of avian origin and a novel
HA subtype that acquired a2,6 SA receptor binding specificity [3].
While many studies have focused on adaptive mutations in the avian
HAs required for acquisition of human receptor specificity, little is
known about the importance of the avian virus internal genes in
pandemic emergence [7,29,30]. In this report, we used reverse
genetics to systematically study reassortants with each of the 63
possible combinations of internal genes from contemporary avian
and human viruses; all with H5N1 surface protein genes.
Collectively, these studies revealed that certain genes, such as
human NP and avian PB2, often caused severe replicative
impairment in cell culture when transferred alone to the
heterologous virus background, whereas transfer of other genes,
such as PB1, was less detrimental. The incompatibility of the
human NP with a full complement of avian influenza genes was
noted in early studies with Fowl Plague virus [13]. This is
significant because the NP gene of influenza virus plays an
important role in host range specificity [5,31,32]. In this report, we
provide evidence suggesting that reassortants with NP of avian
origin in a human virus background can replicate efficiently in
mammalian cell cultures. This phenotype does not require the
presence of other avian virus internal genes, whereas the NP gene
of human origin depends on cognate NS and M genes for
expression of the efficient replication phenotype. The best
characterized event of the viral infectious cycle involving NP, M,
and NS gene products is the nuclear export of viral RNP. In the
nucleus, the influenza nuclear export protein (NEP; encoded by
the NS gene) interacts with the M1 protein, which binds to the
newly assembled viral RNP. NEP also interacts with host protein
CRM1, thereby directing the nuclear export of the viral RNP
complex [33,34,35]. Although a direct interaction between NEP
and NP proteins has not been shown, the severely defective growth
of reassortants possessing heterologous M and NS relative to NP
suggests an unidentified crosstalk between these viral proteins, with
the possible involvement of a host protein(s).
Striking viral phenotypes were also evident in rH5N1 viruses
with heterologous polymerase subunits. The PB1 protein interacts
with PA and PB2 forming transcriptionally active heterotrimers
[36,37,38]. Although a direct interaction between PB2 and PA has
never been reported, our genetic analyses pointed towards a
specific interdependence between PB2 and cognate PA genes of
avian origin, either through direct protein-protein interaction or
concerted interaction with other viral or host factor(s). Interest-
ingly, natural avian-mammalian reassortant viruses isolated from
humans and swine possess PB2 and PA of the same host origin and
sometimes carry a PB1 derived from a virus adapted to a third host
species [39,40]. Thus, linkage between avian PB2 and PA would
be expected in the event of reassortment between an H5N1 virus
and a seasonal H3N2 virus from humans.
The role of the avian PB1 genes in the emergence of reassortant
viruses that caused the 1957 and 1968 influenza pandemics has
remained enigmatic. This study shows that incorporation of an
avian PB1 gene into a background of human virus internal genes
significantly increased mouse virulence. We postulate that
acquisition of the avian PB1 gene, as was seen in the 1957 and
1968 pandemic influenza strains may be a critical factor in the
early stages of a pandemic, allowing the emerging reassortant to
overcome competition with seasonal influenza viruses by enhanc-
ing its replication or virulence. Our results, therefore, have
implications for assessing the potential virulence of novel
reassortant viruses possessing human virus internal genes and
PB1 from currently circulating H5N1 viruses.
Although reassortment between two different viruses could yield
254 possible new genotypes, this study characterized the subset of
63 genotypes with H5N1 surface antigens, of highest public health
significance. In addition, these studies show that a reassortant virus
with NA from a contemporary human H3N2 virus and the
remaining 7 genes from TH04 replicated efficiently and was as
lethal as wt H5N1 virus in mice, indicating that the current human
N2 is compatible with the receptor binding function of the H5 HA.
Although we did not analyze all the 63 additional genotypes
carrying H5N2 surface genes, we anticipate that their virulence
would be similar to their rH5N1 counterparts. However, these
data should be interpreted in a broader context of human and
avian influenza virus replication and evolution. The genotype of
the rH5N1 that would emerge from natural co-infection is dictated
by many factors besides the replication competency of a given
reassortant. Dual infection of a single cell with human and avian
influenza viruses involves co-replication of two genomes that may
complement, interfere, and compete with each other. These events
and the subsequent expansion of the reassortan will be further
conditioned by the host species and tissue tropisms of the parental
viruses and resulting reassortants. Ultimately, while use of reverse
genetics technology to generate reassortants provides an experi-
mental platform free of these many variables, natural reassortment
between two viral genomes, and the consequences therein, are
more complex.
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In summary, we report a strikingly high level of compatibility
between avian and human virus genes. Because few studies have
described naturally occurring or experimentally derived avian-
human reassortants, our results were surprising in that almost half
of the rH5N1 viruses tested showed a high frequency of functional
compatibility between avian and human virus genes. In addition,
approximately 1 in 5 of all possible H5N1 reassortants was lethal
for mice at doses below 104 pfu. The highly virulent reassortant
genotypes identified in this study suggest that introduction of
certain H5N1 viral segments into circulating human H3N2 viruses
may increase their virulence for mice and perhaps other
mammalian species. In addition, the moderately virulent reassor-
tant viruses could circulate in a mammalian host, evolve by
compensatory and/or adaptive mutations, and become more
virulent for humans. The results of this study, therefore,
underscore the necessity for enhanced viral surveillance strategies,
which monitor reassortment events in nature to reduce the public




A/Thailand/16/2004 (TH04) and A/Vietnam/1203/2004
(VN04) H5N1 viruses and A/Wyoming/3/2003 (WY03) H3N2
virus obtained from the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance
Network were provided by Alexander Klimov (CDC, Atlanta,
USA). Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) and human lung
carcinoma (A549) cells were obtained from the American Type
Culture Collection and propagated in Dulbecco’s Modification of
Eagle’s Medium with 10% fetal bovine serum. Viral infectivity was
determined by plaque assay on MDCK cells as described [41].
Reassortant viruses containing any segment derived from the
H5N1 virus were generated in compliance with the Institutional
Biosafety Committee and NIH Guidelines for Research Involving
Recombinant DNA Molecules. Viruses were handled in biosafety
level 3 containment, including enhancements required by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the Select Agents program http://
www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/bmbl5toc.htm.
Generation of reassortant viruses by reverse genetics
RT-PCR amplicons of the eight viral genes from WY03 and
TH04 viruses were cloned into a dual-promoter plasmid for
influenza A reverse genetics [42]. Virus rescue was performed by
plasmid DNA transfection into co-cultured 293T/MDCK cells
[42]. Culture medium from the transfected cells was harvested at
72 h and analyzed by plaque assay on MDCK monolayers. The
plaque count and diameter were recorded as a measure of the
virus rescue efficiency from plasmid DNA. DNA transfection of
each genotype was performed at least three times independently.
WY03 and TH04 rg plasmid sets were included as controls during
each reassortant rescue to evaluate experimental variation. Viruses
with H5 HA were propagated in 10–11 days old embryonated
chicken eggs. The H3N2 virus was propagated in MDCK cells in
the presence of 1 mg/ml TPCK-treated trypsin. Following
propagation, the full genomes of reassortant viruses were
sequenced to confirm presence of parental virus sequence.
Luciferase mini-genome reporter assay
A549 cells cultured in 24-well tissue culture plates were co-
transfected with pPol1-NS-Renilla (100 ng) encoding a reporter
mini-genome under transcriptional control of the human RNA
polymerase I, pSV-Luc (200 ng) encoding firefly luciferase under
SV40 virus RNA polymerase II promoter control, and four
plasmids expressing viral PB2, PB1, PA, NP (50 ng each) from the
strain of interest. Twenty-four hours after the transfection, the cell
lysates were harvested and further diluted to perform the dual
luciferase assay according to the manufacturer’s protocol (Pro-
mega). The influenza polymerase catalytic activity derived from
the Renilla luciferase plasmid (pPol1-NS-Renilla) was corrected to
account for well-to-well differences in transfection efficiency using
the firefly luciferase activity values from pSV-Luc plasmid.
Pathogenicity studies in mice
Groups of 6-8 week old female BALB/c mice (Jackson
Laboratories, Bar Harbor, ME) were placed under light anesthesia
and inoculated intranasally with 50 ml of serial 10-fold dilutions of
infectious virus in PBS. For reassortant viruses tested, 104 pfu of
virus was the highest dose used to infect mice; for WY03 virus,
106 pfu of virus was tested. Three mice from each group were
euthanized at 4 days post-infection (dpi) and nasal turbinates,
lungs, spleens, and brains were harvested, immediately frozen on
dry ice, and stored at 280uC until further processing. Whole
tissues were thawed, homogenized in 1 ml of cold PBS, and
clarified by centrifugation (2,2006g) at 4uC. Virus titers of
homogenates were determined by plaque assay in MDCK cells.
Five additional mice in each group were monitored daily for
clinical signs for 14 dpi. Mice that lost more than 25% of their
body weight were euthanized humanely. The fifty percent mouse
infectious dose (MID50) and fifty percent lethal dose (LD50) were
calculated and expressed as the pfu value corresponding to 1
MID50 or LD50. Animal studies were conducted per approved
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee protocols.
Statistical analysis
Statistically significant differences of rescue efficiencies of avian-
human reassortants in cell culture were determined by F-test
adjusted for multiple comparisons. LD50 and MID50 values were
calculated using the method of Reed and Muench [43].
Statistically significant differences between LD50 values of viruses
in virulence group A1 and A2 were determined by comparing
groups A1 and A2 to TH04 WT and group A1 to group A2 using
an analysis of variance performed by an F test for multiple
comparisons.
Viral replication in differentiated primary human
tracheobronchial epithelial cells
Growth and differentiation of primary human tracheobronchial
epithelial cells were performed as described previously [23,30,44].
Briefly, primary cells (passage level 3) were seeded in porous
membrane inserts (Corning, 4.5 mm, 12 mm diameter) at the
density of 56104 cell/cm2. Three days after seeding the cells, the
medium from the apical side was removed and the confluent
monolayers were cultured at an air-liquid interface. The medium
from the basal compartment was replaced daily, and the in vitro
differentiation of primary cells was achieved after 4–6 weeks.
Differentiated cells with trans-epithelial electrical resistance of
$300V cm2 were used in our study. Kinetic analysis of reassortant
virus growth was performed after infection of the monolayer at a
multiplicity of infection (moi) of 0.02 pfu/cell as described [23,30];
apically released virus was harvested at the appropriate times and
analyzed by plaque assay.
Accession numbers
The GenBank (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez) ac-
cession numbers for the genes described in this paper are:
EU268216 (A/Thailand/16/2004, PB2 gene), EU268217 (A/
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Thailand/16/2004, PB1 gene), EU268218 (A/Thailand/16/
2004, PA gene), EU268219 (A/Thailand/16/2004, HA gene),
EU268220 (A/Thailand/16/2004, NP gene), EU268221 (A/
Thailand/16/2004, NA gene), EU268222 (A/Thailand/16/2004,
M gene), EU268223 (A/Thailand/16/2004, NS gene), EU268224
(A/Wyoming/03/2003, PB2 gene), EU268225 (A/Wyoming/03/
2003, PB1 gene), EU268226 (A/Wyoming/03/2003, PA gene),
EU268227 (A/Wyoming/03/2003, HA gene), EU268228 (A/
Wyoming/03/2003, NP gene), EU268229 (A/Wyoming/03/
2003, NA gene), EU268230 (A/Wyoming/03/2003, M gene),
EU268231 (A/Wyoming/03/2003, NS gene).
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